The Neural Basis of Mentalizing  by Frith, Chris D. & Frith, Uta
Neuron 50, 531–534, May 18, 2006 ª2006 Elsevier Inc. DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001MinireviewThe Neural Basis of MentalizingChris D. Frith1,* and Uta Frith2
1Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience
2 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
University College London
London WC1N 3BG
United Kingdom
Mentalizing refers to our ability to read the mental
states of other agents and engages many neural pro-
cesses. The brain’s mirror system allows us to share
the emotions of others. Through perspective taking,
we can infer what a person currently believes about
the world given their point of view. Finally, the human
brain has the unique ability to represent the mental
states of the self and the other and the relationship be-
tween these mental states, making possible the com-
munication of ideas.
What Is Mentalizing?
The term mentalizing was coined to refer to the process
by which we make inferences about mental states. Much
of the time these inferences are made automatically,
without any thought or deliberation. It is important for
us to be able to read the minds of others because it is
their mental states that determine their actions. This as-
sumption that behavior is caused by mental states has
been called ‘‘the intentional stance’’ (Dennett, 1987) or
‘‘having a theory of mind’’ (Premack and Woodruff,
1978). There are many different types of mental states
that can affect the way we interact with others. There
are long-term dispositions: one person may be trustwor-
thy and reliable while another is hopelessly volatile.
There are short-term emotional states like happiness
and anger. There are desires like thirst and their associ-
ated goal-directed intentions (e.g., fetching a bottle of
wine from the fridge). There are the beliefs that we
have about the world. These beliefs determine our be-
havior even when they are false (someone has secretly
removed the wine from the fridge) or not shared by
others (English wine can be very pleasant). Finally, we
shall consider the role of communicative intent.
How Do We Mentalize?
Many cues in different modalities can trigger the pro-
cess of mentalizing as long as they originate from an
agent. Agency can be perceived in other animals and
even in moving objects (Heider and Simmel, 1944), but
the agents we are most interested in are our conspe-
cifics. Their faces, in particular, are an important source
of information about their inner states. For example,
there is agreement about what a trustworthy person
looks like even though this is an example of a prejudice
with little basis in reality. Emotions, on the other hand,
can be validly read from facial expressions, from voices,
and from whole-body movements (Adolphs, 2002).
Desires, goals, and intentions can be read from eye
gaze direction and body movements (Langton et al.,
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edge depends on experience, so that someone may not
know what we know because they have not seen what
we have seen (Wimmer et al., 1988). Note that this exam-
ple involves perspective taking, a vital aspect of suc-
cessful mentalizing. Communicative intentions are per-
ceived when someone calls our name or makes eye
contact (Sperber and Wilson, 1995).
The Brain’s Mirror System
Simulation theory proposes that we can understand the
mental states of others on the basis of our own mental
states (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Commonalities
between the self and the other have been observed in
a number of brain imaging studies. There is a ‘‘mirror’’
system in the brain such that the same areas are
activated when we observe another person experienc-
ing an emotion as when we experience the same emo-
tion ourselves, as if by contagion. Through such a mech-
anism we can experience the emotional states of
another person. The brain’s mirror system is engaged
by actions as well as emotions (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004) to the extent that we automatically imitate the
movements of others (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999)
even when this interferes with our own actions (Kilner
et al., 2003).
However, experiencing the same emotion as another
is not sufficient to infer the cause of that emotion
and hence is only a first step for mentalizing. Likewise,
covertly performing the same action as another is not
sufficient to infer the goals and intentions behind
that action. Furthermore, as Mitchell et al. (2006) (this
issue of Neuron) point out, while the mirror system is
ideally suited for tracking the continually changing
states of emotion and intention of the other, it can tell
us nothing about the stable attitudes and predilec-
tions of the other, which we also perceive as important
determinants of behavior, and hence of our ‘‘theory of
mind.’’
There are two problems to be solved. First, how do we
infer the causes of the emotions and actions of the
other? Second, on the basis of what we know about the
other, how do we predict what he or she will do next?
Some answers to these questions come from studies
of the neural correlates of mentalizing.
The Neural Correlates of Mentalizing
Over the last ten years, many imaging studies have been
conducted on the neural basis of mentalizing. A wide
range of different paradigms have been used in which,
for example, participants read stories, watch moving
shapes, or play interactive games. The common feature
in all these paradigms is that the participants have to
think about the mental states of another person. The re-
sults have been remarkably consistent, implicating a set
of regions that include pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles
and the medial prefrontal cortex (Frith and Frith, 2003).
The precise roles of these different regions are now be-
ginning to emerge.
Perspective Taking
Through recognizing their facial expression, we might
know that someone is afraid. But what are they afraid
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check what they are looking at. The region of the brain at
the posterior end of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
and the adjacent temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is
a prime candidate for this process. First, this region is
involved in eye-movement observation and provides in-
formation about where someone is looking (Pelphrey
et al., 2004). Second, this region is involved in represent-
ing the world from different visual perspectives (Aich-
horn et al., 2005), probably as a consequence of its role
in representing the position of the body in space (Blanke
et al., 2005). Knowing where a person is looking and what
they can see, given their vantage point, enables us to
know what they are looking at and thus identify the cause
of their fear. This ability to see the world from another’s
perspective enables us to realize that other people can
have different knowledge from us and may have false
beliefs about the world. ‘‘He thinks he is safe because
he can’t see the bear coming up behind him.’’ There is
evidence that the temporo-parietal junction has a neces-
sary and more general role in the performance of tasks
that depend upon understanding that a person has
a false belief about the world (Apperly et al., 2004).
Knowledge of the World
Through experience, we build up a rich store of knowl-
edge about the world that is important for our ability to
mentalize. We learn about specific people: what they
look like, where they live, whether they are trustworthy,
and so on. We also learn about the moment-to-moment
changes of the situations in which people find them-
selves and how their feelings, knowledge, and disposi-
tions affect their behavior. We learn about the kinds of
behavior that are appropriate in these different situa-
tions. Damage to the temporal poles can impair the abil-
ity to use this knowledge (Funnell, 2001). This observa-
tion is consistent with the suggestion that the temporal
poles are convergence zones where simpler features
from different modalities are brought together to define,
by their conjunction, unique individuals and situations
(Damasio et al., 2004). Through this convergence of in-
formation, our understanding of an object can be modi-
fied by the context in which it appears (Ganis and Kutas,
2003). These processes instantiated in the temporal
poles are important for mentalizing, not only in allowing
us to apply general knowledge, but also to use moment-
to-moment knowledge about a particular person in a par-
ticular place. They specify what the person is likely to be
thinking and feeling and the kinds of thoughts and feel-
ings most likely to occur in a particular context, e.g.,
pride or embarrassment caused by otherwise similar
actions. This is even before the other person shows the
feelings and performs the actions, which we can pick up
via the mirror system.
Anticipating the Future
The final region we shall consider in this review is the
medial prefrontal cortex and the adjacent paracingulate
cortex. This rather large region has been consistently
activated when participants think about mental states,
whether these are long-term dispositions and attributes
or short-term intentions and beliefs. The precise role of
this region remains controversial. Patients with damage
to frontal cortex are frequently impaired in the perfor-
mance of ‘‘theory of mind’’ tasks (Stuss et al., 2001).
However, it has not proven easy to locate the criticaldamage more precisely, and there is one case reported
where damage restricted to mPFC did not lead to im-
pairment in the performance of ToM tasks (Bird et al.,
2004). Perhaps the processes instantiated in this area
are typically elicited when we think about mental states
but are not actually necessary for the performance of
standard ToM tasks. TMS techniques might provide an
appropriate means to explore this question.
Understanding People Like Us
In general, prefrontal cortex is concerned with planning
for the future and representing anticipated states of the
world (Ingvar, 1985; Shallice, 1988). Thus, in the specific
case of mentalizing, mPFC may be concerned with antic-
ipating what a person is going to think and feel and
thereby predict what they are going to do. How are such
predictions made? It has long been noted that activity is
seen in mPFC, not only when thinking about the mental
states of others, but also when thinking about mental
states of the self (Frith and Frith, 1999). This observation
is consistent with a simulationist account that suggests
that we can predict what someone else will think and
feel by considering what we would think and feel if we
were in their situation. The problem for this approach is
that it only works well if we are very similar to the person
whose behavior we are trying to predict. Mitchell et al.
(2006) report an elegant experiment that directly investi-
gates the effect of similarity. Participants were told about
two target individuals who were described as having lib-
eral or conservative views. They were then asked to pre-
dict the feelings and attitudes of these two targets in var-
ious situations (e.g., ‘‘would he enjoy having a roommate
from a different country’’). Subsequently the political
attitudes of the participants were also assessed. The re-
sults show a different pattern when thinking about a sim-
ilar or a dissimilar other. Thinking about similar others
was associated with activity in ventral mPFC (18,
57, 9—in the region labeled anterior rostral MFC in
Amodio and Frith [2006]), while thinking about a dissimi-
lar other was associated with activity in a more dorsal
region of mPFC (29, 45, 42—posterior rostral MFC).
This is strong evidence for segregation of function
within the area of medial prefrontal cortex associated
with mentalizing. There are hints at segregation in other
recent studies (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the seg-
regation in medial frontal cortex suggested by these
studies). Hynes et al. (2006) asked participants to
make inferences about what other people were thinking
(cognitive perspective taking) or what they were feeling
(emotional perspective taking). Thinking about people’s
feelings was associated with activity in medial orbital
cortex (18, 63, 27), while perspective taking in general
was associated with activity in more dorsal regions
(2, 59, 15; 24, 60, 30). Walter et al. (2004) asked partici-
pants to make inferences about private intentions
(changing a broken light bulb in order to read a book) in
contrast to communicative intentions (showing some-
one a map in order to ask the way). Thinking about com-
municative intentions activated a more ventral region
(23, 54, 15) than thinking about private intentions.
Gre`zes et al. (2004) asked participants to infer whether
the movements associated with the lifting of a box
were intended to be deceptive since the actor might be
pretending that the box was heavier than it really was.
Movements thought to be deceptive activated anterior
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533Figure 1. Segregation of Activity Associated
with Mentalizing Tasks in Medial Frontal
Cortex
This is a view of the medial surface of the
brain in Talairach space with numbers on
the cortex indicating the approximate loca-
tion of the relevant Brodmann areas. The
red dividing lines are based upon metaanaly-
ses of functional imaging studies reviewed in
Amodio and Frith (2006). The colored sym-
bols indicate the location of peak activations
from four recent studies of mentalizing:
Mitchell et al. (2006)—similar others, blue
square; dissimilar others, green square; Hy-
nes et al. (2006)—feelings, red diamond; point
of view, blue diamond; Walter et al. (2004)—
communicative, blue triangle; private, green
triangle; Gre`zes et al. (2004)—communica-
tive, blue circle; private, green circle.rostral MFC (28, 42, 20). In another experiment the par-
ticipants observed movements, which sometimes in-
cluded unexpected adjustments, because the box being
picked up was lighter than the actor expected. Observ-
ing these unexpected adjustments was associated with
activity in posterior rostral MFC (2, 26, 52).
These observations suggest subdivisions of MFC re-
lating to different aspects of mentalizing. Amodio and
Frith (2006) suggest that the most ventral region (medial
orbital cortex, z < 2) is concerned with the monitoring of
emotions in self and other, while the most dorsal region
(posterior rostral MFC, including the ‘‘cognitive’’ section
of ACC) is concerned with the monitoring of actions,
again in both self and other. In between these two re-
gions is the region (anterior rostral MFC), which is acti-
vated when thinking about people similar to ourselves
and is also activated when we perceive that another per-
son intends to communicate with us.
Why should this region be more active when predict-
ing the behavior of people similar to ourselves? One
possibility is that this part of the cortex can combine in-
formation about emotions and actions, since it is adja-
cent to the two regions with these specialities. When
deciding what to do we are not totally ‘‘rational’’ in our
choice of action: our choice is colored by emotions such
as anticipated regret or desire for fairness. Inferences
about the most rational action in the circumstances ap-
ply to everyone whether we are similar to them or not.
Such inferences can be made via the action-monitoring
system. But we can only take account of the role of emo-
tions in the choice of action in people similar to our-
selves who are likely to feel the same emotions.
Communicative Intent
However, while this may be part of the story, it does not
explain why this region is specifically activated by tasks
involving communicative intent. Communicative intent
requires a special form of metacognition (Amodio and
Frith, 2006). The point of communication is to alter the
mental state of the person we are communicating with,
for instance, by imparting new knowledge. To be recep-
tive to this new knowledge, the listener has to be able to
perceive the speaker’s intention to communicate(Sperber and Wilson, 1995). For successful communica-
tion, it is not sufficient for the speaker to represent the
mental state of the listener. Both speaker and listener
have to recognize that the listener is representing the
speaker’s mental state and that the signals coming
from the speaker, whether words or simply movements,
are emitted with the intention of altering the listener’s
mental state. Perhaps the simplest case for which this
kind of understanding is needed is shared attention,
when one person gazes at or points to an object so
that the object can become the focus of attention for an-
other person also. We would characterize this as a prime
example of communicative intent. Saxe (2006) suggests
that dorsal MFC may have a specific role in such triadic
social interaction, which according to Tomasello et al.
(2005) is a uniquely human ability. It is therefore interest-
ing that the region of medial prefrontal cortex implicated
in the process has enlarged dramatically in the recent
course of evolution (Semendeferi et al., 2001). Returning
to the result of Mitchell et al. (2006), when we think about
people similar to ourselves, do we automatically acti-
vate regions concerned with creating our shared view
of the world, poised to communicate with them?
We are still at the very early stages of understanding
how the brain permits us to read the minds of others.
Our account of the roles of the various regions impli-
cated in this process is of necessity speculative. How-
ever, these speculations generate a number of clear
predictions, and the methodology is available for well-
designed experiments like that of Mitchell et al. (2006)
to test these predictions. Reading the minds of our col-
leagues in the burgeoning field of social cognitive neuro-
science, we predict that over the next few years our un-
derstanding of the brain’s mentalizing system will
increase dramatically.
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